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Abstract11
Theory for the evolution of social interactions based on continuous12
strategies often assumes for simplicity that expressed behaviours are13
independent from previous encounters. In reality, however, such14
dependencies are likely to be widespread and often strong, generating15
complex behavioural dynamics. To model this process and illustrate16
potential consequences for the evolution of behavioural interactions, we17
consider the behavioural dynamics of the interaction between caring18
parents and their demanding offspring, a prime example for long series of19
interdependent and highly dynamic interactions. These dynamics can be20
modelled using functions describing mechanisms for how parents and their21
offspring respond to each other in the interaction. We establish the general22
conditions under which the behavioural dynamics converge towards a23
proximate equilibrium and refer to such converging interactions as24
behaviourally stable strategies (BSSs). We further demonstrate that there25
is scope for behavioural instability under realistic conditions; that is,26
whenever parents and/or offspring ’overreact’ beyond some threshold. By27
applying the derived condition for behavioural stability to evolutionary28
models of parent-offspring conflict resolution, we show by numerical29
simulations that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of current models30
are not necessarily behaviourally stable. Because behavioural instability31
implies that expressed levels of behaviours deviate from the ESS,32
behavioural stability is required for strict evolutionary stability in repeated33
behavioural interactions.34
Key words: behavioural dynamics; ESS; game theory; interacting35
phenotypes; parent-offspring conflict; social interaction36
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Conspicuous offspring behaviours and displays to demand resources from37
their parents can be observed in most animal species with parental care38
(Clutton-Brock 1991). According to parent-offspring conflict (POC) theory,39
offspring are usually selected to demand more resources from their parents40
than the parents should provide (Trivers 1974). This phenomenon can be41
evolutionarily explained in terms of the outcome of the POC over resource42
distribution, where offspring begging and parental provisioning strategies43
reflect an evolved resolution of this conflict (Trivers 1974; Parker 1985;44
Godfray 1995; Kilner & Johnstone 1997; Mock & Parker 1997; Royle et al.45
2002). There are two main types of game-theoretic approaches to modelling46
conflict resolution. The ’scramble competition’ model assumes that47
offspring control parental food allocation (Parker & Macnair 1979; Parker48
1985; Parker et al. 2002). The ’honest signalling’ model assumes, that49
parents control food allocation (Godfray 1991; Godfray & Johnstone 2000).50
Both types of models can explain the evolution of condition-dependent,51
conspicuous and costly offspring begging and parental response.52
These models generally assume for simplicity a single interaction, or53
equivalently multiple independent interactions, between parent and54
offspring (Maynard-Smith 1982; Parker 1985; Houston et al. 1988; Godfray55
1999; McNamara et al. 1999; Godfray & Johnstone 2000; Royle et al. 2002;56
but see Johnstone 1996 for a two-step exception) and the evolving57
strategies are taken to be adequately represented by the behavioural58
outcome of a one-off interaction. However, in reality the interactions59
between parents and offspring are behaviourally very dynamic and60
typically involve repeated encounters that are interdependent (McNamara61
et al. 1999; Godfray & Johnstone 2000). The issue of stability has been62
thoroughly explored in conflict resolution models from the perspective of63
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evolutionary stability (e.g. Takada & Kigami 1991; Rodríguez-Gironés64
et al. 1998; McNamara et al. 1999). But it is not known whether, and65
under what conditions, the behavioural dynamics of repeated66
parent-offspring interactions allow the behaviours actually to be expressed67
according to the idealized strategies in the evolutionary models.68
Here, we model the repeated parent-offspring interaction using a69
behavioural reaction norm approach (Smiseth et al. 2008) in an expanded70
negotiation model framework (Moore et al. 1997; McNamara et al. 1999;71
Taylor & Day 2004; Johnstone & Hinde 2006), where a demand function72
defines how offspring adjust their begging to variation in parental73
provisioning, and a supply function defines how parents adjust their74
provisioning to variation in offspring begging (Fig. 1; Hussell 1988). These75
functions define how parents and offspring react to each other, and the76
resulting dynamics can be considered as a negotiation process. Under this77
perspective, evolutionary strategies can be represented by the slopes78
and/or shapes of these functions, mediate the behavioural dynamics of the79
interaction (Smiseth et al. 2008). In his graphical model, Hussell (1988)80
focussed on the expected behavioural equilibrium over multiple81
interdependent parent-offspring interactions (see also Kölliker 2003). This82
equilibrium represents the behavioural strategies considered in the game83
theoretic conflict resolution (Godfray 1991; Mock & Parker 1997; Parker84
et al. 2002) and quantitative genetic coadaptation models (Wolf & Brodie85
1998; Kölliker et al. 2005). However, given a pair of supply and demand86
functions, the behavioural dynamics of the repeated parent-offspring87
interactions may, or may not, lead to this equilibrium. Thereby, the shapes88
of the supply and demand functions affect the stability of the behavioural89
equilibrium (Samuelson 1976). Understanding the conditions under which90
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the behavioural equilibrium is actually reached in the interaction is critical,91
because only a stable behavioural equilibrium can adequately represent92
strategies in current evolutionary resolution models (see Samuelson 197693
for an economical context).94
We provide a formal model and results from numerical analyses exploring95
the stability of behavioural equilibria and behavioural strategies in96
parent-offspring interactions for different shapes of supply and demand97
functions. We also show for a range of realistic conditions that current98
conflict resolution models predict evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs)99
that are behaviourally not stable.100
The Model101
Behavioural equilibria102
The offspring behavioural reaction norm for demand (Taylor & Day 2004;103
Smiseth et al. 2008) is defined by the demand function D = f(S),104
describing the dependence of offspring begging on parental provisioning.105
The parental behavioural reaction norm for supply (Taylor & Day 2004;106
Smiseth et al. 2008) is defined by the supply function S = g(D), describing107
the dependence of parental provisioning on offspring begging. The108
interdependence of the two recursive functions can be used to model the109
behavioural dynamics over repeated interactions of parents and offspring110
(Fig. 1).111
To display and formalize this feedback and find the behavioural112
equilibrium, the arguments of the two functions need to be expressed in the113
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same currency. This can graphically be achieved by inverting the supply114
function and superimposing it on the demand function (Hussell 1988). The115
intersection point of the two functions represents the behavioural116
equilibrium. Formally, the behavioural equilibrium is derived by inverting117
the supply function, setting it equal to the demand function:118
f(Seq) = g−1(Seq).
Then solving for Seq, where Seq is the equilibrium value for the supply and119
setting Seq in the demand function yields the equilibrium value for demand120
Deq (Kölliker 2003).121
Stability of behavioural equilibria122
To address the behavioural stability of the equilibria, the dynamics of123
parent and offspring behaviours over repeated interactions need to be124
explored explicitly. Only when repeated parent-offspring interactions125
converge towards the equilibrium, the equilibrium and the strategies are126
behaviourally stable (Fig. 1a). At such an equilibrium we refer to the pairs127
of strategies as behaviourally stable strategies (BSSs), represented by the128
slopes and/or shapes of the supply and demand functions. When repeated129
parent-offspring interactions diverge away from the equilibrium, the130
equilibrium and the strategies are behaviourally not stable (Fig. 1b). We131
used the standard mathematical techniques based on discrete-time132
dynamics to address the stability of behavioural equilibria (Otto & Day133
2007, pp. 163 - 169). In our model, discrete time steps are from one134
specific interaction (offspring demands, parent provides) to the next and135
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the process is started with an offspring begging event.136
Our model in principle explores a behavioural negotiation process between137
parents and offspring (e.g. McNamara et al. 1999; Taylor & Day 2004;138
Johnstone & Hinde 2006) in which parent and offspring interact according139
to their behavioural reaction norms. In contrast to previous models (e.g.140
McNamara et al. 1999; Taylor & Day 2004; Johnstone & Hinde 2006), we141
focus on the behavioural process and allow for asymmetric functions, as we142
have parental supply and offspring demand in our model, which are143
represented by response mechanisms for different kinds of behaviour.144
Numerical analyses145
To further explore the behavioural dynamics of parent-offspring146
interactions explicitly, we also used numerical simulations for the changes of147
demand (begging) level and supply (provisioning) level over a series of 2000148
time steps for a given set of supply and demand functions (Fig. 1). For the149
first time step the initial demand level D0 was given and for subsequent150
steps the value of the supply function was used as argument of the demand151
function and vice versa. The initial demand level was randomly chosen152
within 10% around the equilibrium Deq. This choice increased the153
likelihood of reaching the equilibrium with 2000 interactions even when the154
process of convergence was slow. But any initial demand level could have155
been chosen. There was no effect of initial condition on the outcome156
(stability/instability) of the interaction (see Results). Values for supply157
and demand were represented on a standardized scale from 0 (minimum) to158
1 (maximum). The functions we used for supply and demand were strictly159
monotonic (see below). A maximum level of demand was set at the point of160
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no supply, resulting in intercepts of 1 for the demand function and 0 for the161
supply function. The interactions between parents and offspring were162
assumed to be error free. That is, the dynamics of the behavioural163
interaction strictly followed the supply and demand functions without any164
deviation. For simplicity we assumed a single offspring interacting with a165
single parent (Hussell 1988; Godfray 1991; Kölliker et al. 2005).166
Specific function types167
We numerically investigated the impact of two different types of functions168
on behavioural stability. Linear functions are the simplest and usual way to169
represent the parent-offspring interaction. They are standard in170
quantitative genetic maternal effect (Kirkpatrick & Lande 1989) and171
coadaptation models (Wolf & Brodie 1998; Kölliker 2003; Kölliker et al.172
2005), and reflect the local gradients in game-theoretic conflict resolution173
models (Godfray 1991; Parker et al. 2002). In addition, to simulate the174
consequences of slightly more complex responses on the behavioural175
dynamics, we used power functions (Smiseth et al. 2008), for which the176
slopes are not constant but change with the level of supply and demand.177
This may have important consequences for the behavioural dynamics and178
stability of the parent-offspring interaction.179
In the linear case, the supply function was defined as S = g(D) = aD + y,180
with slope a and intercept y = 0 (Fig. 2a). The demand function was181
defined as D = f(S) = bS + x, with slope b and intercept x = 1 (Fig. 2b).182
The intercepts reflect the previously mentioned assumption of maximal183
begging in the absence of provisioning. The slopes a of the supply function184
could vary between zero and infinity (0 < a <∞) and the slopes b for the185
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demand function between minus infinity to zero (−∞ < b < 0).186
In the case of power functions, the supply function was defined as187
S = g(D) = 1− (1−D)k (Fig. 2c) and the demand function was defined as188
D = f(S) = (1− S)l (Fig. 2d). The parameters k and l define the189
corresponding strength and direction of the curvature and could both range190
from zero to infinity (0 < k <∞, 0 < l <∞).191
Numerical application to ESS models192
The link between behavioural dynamics and evolutionary stability was193
explored by applying our BSS condition to an already existing ESS model194
in a numerical sensitivity analysis. We chose the scramble competition195
resolution model, for which the role of supply and demand functions has196
been made explicit (Parker 1985; Mock & Parker 1997; Parker et al. 2002).197
But our analysis in principle also applies to honest signalling models198
(Godfray 1991; Godfray & Johnstone 2000), although this is based on a199
different (i.e. additive rather than multiplicative) fitness model. Scramble200
competition models assume that parents have a fixed quantity of resources201
available for reproduction. A unit of investment in a given offspring202
enhances that offspring’s survival chances, but at the expense of other203
offspring the parent can produce. Offspring survival chances follow a curve204
of diminishing returns with respect to the parental resources obtained205
(Smith & Fretwell 1974; Parker 1985). Further, for evolutionary stability,206
offspring begging has to be costly. For simplicity, we assume that offspring207
survival decreases linearly with increased begging (Parker et al. 2002). To208
allow direct comparison with the evolutionary model, the dimensionless209
level of supply in our behavioural model can be interpreted in units of210
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parental investment.211
The scramble competition ESS is defined via the local gradients of supply212
and demand functions at the ESS (Parker 1985; Mock & Parker 1997; see213
Appendix), which are parameters in the model and assumed to be214
nonevolving. We carried out a broad numerical sensitivity analysis, varying215
the gradients (i.e. the slopes) of the supply and demand functions and the216
parameters p and q of the associated cost and benefit functions of begging217
and provisioning, respectively (see Parker et al. 2002 and Appendix for218
details of the functions), to test for the behavioural stability of the ESS for219
specific sets of supply and demand functions (with known slopes and220
intercepts) and, hence, whether they are BSSs or not.221
To explore numerically the parameter space of the scramble competition222
ESSs for converging behavioural dynamics we performed the following223
steps: 1) We generated a behavioural equilibrium grid for the supply and224
demand function pairs (1’000’000 behavioural equilibria; 1’000 demand225
levels and 1’000 supply levels, evenly distributed) in the parameter range of226
our model. 2) We calculated the ESSs according to the scramble227
competition model (Parker & Macnair 1979; Parker 1985; Parker et al.228
2002) in terms of a demand and supply function pairs (according to Eqs229
A-2 and A-3). 3) For all of these function pairs we checked whether the230
intercept of the demand function was close to 1 and that for the supply231
function close to 0 to fulfil the assumptions we made to derive the BSS232
conditions. Intercepts were deemed close enough when they deviated by less233
than 0.005. 4) The equilibria of those funtion pairs which satisfied these234
criteria were matched to the behavioural equilibrium grid generated before235
(see step 1). We took the numerical values for the behavioural equilibrium236
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and the evolutionary equilibrium to be equal when they were within a237
margin of ± 0.001, which corresponds to the resolution of the behavioural238
equilibrium grid. 5) In cases where we found more than one function pair239
that numerically satisfied our matching conditions, we chose the one with240
the smallest mismatch to be the ’true’ one, as we expected only one ESS241
per parameter combination p and q. Choosing another pair did not alter242
the final result (i.e. whether an ESS was behaviourally stable or not). 6)243
For the slope combinations where behavioural and evolutionary equilibrium244
matched, we checked whether or not the equilibrium was also behaviourally245
stable. For this we applied the stability conditions of our formal model.246
We ran our model for 90 different fitness parameter value combinations p247
and q in the cost and benefit functions of the scramble competition model248
(see Parker et al. 2002 and Appendix for details of the functions).249
Variation in these fitness parameters may have an impact on the outcome250
of the behavioural stability of the POC resolution, because different slopes251
for demand and supply functions are required to reach the ESS.252
We used R version 2.4.0 (2006-10-03) and Mathematica 6.0.1.0 for the253
analyses and simulations (R Development Core Team 2006; Wolfram254
Research, Inc. 2007).255
Results256
Stability of behavioural equilibria and numerical analyses257
We calculated the stability index λ following Otto & Day (2007) for258
discrete-time dynamics systems. λ allows us to determine if a dynamic259
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system that is close to an equilibrium converges towards, or diverges away260
from, this equilibrium from one time-step to the next. In our case, it is the261
derivative of the function describing the begging level at the next time262
step, which is a combination of the supply and demand function. In our263
model this is264
λ = f ′(Sn),
where f(Sn) = Dn+1 is the begging level after one interaction when265
starting at Dn, with266
Dn+1 = f(Sn) = f(g(Dn)).
Sn is the supply level and f(Sn) the demand function. f(g(Dn)) is again267
the demand function, expressed as a function of the demand level one268
interaction before. The resulting value for λ is269
λ = f ′(Sn) = f ′(g(Dn))g′(Dn) = f ′(Sn)g′(Dn).
(Note that g(Dn) = Sn).270
For linear demand and supply functions we get271
f(Sn) = Dn+1 = b(aDn + y) + x,
where x and y are the intercepts of the demand and supply function,272
respectively. And for λ we get273
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λ = ab.
A value of λ between −1 and 1 indicates a stable dynamic equilibrium274
(Otto & Day 2007). So the general stability condition for the behavioural275
interaction between a parent and its offspring is276
λ = |ab| < 1. (1)
For the case of linear supply and demand functions, this condition is for277
local and global stability; it is not only valid at/near the equilibrium but278
for any initial begging level Dn, because the functions involved are linear279
and the slopes a and b apply over the whole range. This stability condition280
can also be proven by using the convergence criteria for infinite repeated281
interactions between parent and offspring (see Appendix).282
Numerical simulations283
Our numerical simulations deal only with a subset of all possible functions,284
namely a supply function with a positive slope a (parent increases supply285
level with increasing demand level) and a demand function with a negative286
slope b (offspring decreases demand level with increasing supply level) (Figs287
2a and b). This assumption is also made in scramble competition models288
(Parker et al. 2002). The stability condition under these assumptions and289
for linear supply and demand functions is290
−1 < ab < 0.
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This solution is a partial solution of the conditions for general stability291
derived earlier (Eq. 1), confirming the result of our formal model. The292
product of the two parameters a and b defines the behavioural stability of293
linear parent-offspring interactions. When ab has a value between −1 and 0294
(−1 < ab < 0), then the repeated interactions of parent and offspring295
converge towards the equilibrium and reflect a BSS. In all these cases the296
two functions intersect at a demand level between 0.5 and 1297
(0.5 < Deq < 1, Fig. 3a), under the assumptions of our model (i.e. slopes of298
the functions are of opposite sign and the intercepts are 0 and 1,299
respectively). The threshold level of 0.5 can be derived analytically (see300
Appendix, A-1). That half of the function pairs that intersect above a301
demand level of 0.5 represent a BSS. The half of the function pairs that302
intersect below a demand level of 0.5 represent behaviourally not stable303
strategies, resulting in divergence of the behavioural interaction.304
For the power functions (Figs 2c and d), the local stability conditions305
follow the general rule306
−1 < f ′(Seq)g′(Deq) < 1. (2)
f ′(Seq) is the derivative (local gradient) of the demand function at the307
equilibrium and g′(Deq) is the derivative of the supply function at the308
equilibrium.309
According to the results of our simulation, this stability condition seems310
not only valid at the equilibrium but over the whole value range of possible311
initial demand levels (data not shown). So we can state the general312
stability conditions for the power functions within the value range of our313
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numerical simulation as follows:314
−1 < f ′(S)g′(D) < 0.
This is equivalent to the stability condition for linear functions, but315
generalized to the case of non-linear power functions. The behavioural316
stability of the parent-offspring interaction depends only on the derivatives317
(the slopes) of the describing functions of demand and supply. Again,318
under the assumptions of our model, all supply and demand function pairs319
that intersect at a level of demand between 0.5 and 1 (0.5 < Deq < 1) have320
a behaviourally stable equilibrium (Fig. 3b), whereas those that intersect321
between 0 and 0.5 (0 < Deq < 0.5) do not.322
Numerical application to ESS models323
For 17 out of the 90 simulations the ESS was outside the considered324
parameter space or the intercepts deviated too much from 1 (for the325
demand function) or 0 (for the supply function). For 73 simulations we326
found ESSs inside the considered parameter space where the intercepts of327
the functions matched to 1 and 0, respectively. For 16 cases the difference328
between ESS and BSS was larger than our matching criteria (i.e. the329
difference in either demand level or supply level was larger than 0.001 (our330
grid resolution) and the function pair could hence not be clearly assigned331
to one grid point). Out of the remaining 57 cases where the intercepts332
fulfilled our matching criteria, 33 turned out to be behaviourally stable333
(BSS) and 24 were behaviourally not stable (Table 1).334
ESSs were behaviourally stable in the lower range of explored begging costs335
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(q ranging from -0.1 to -0.35), representing higher numerical values for ESS336
levels of demand. For higher begging cost parameter values, and the337
correspondingly lower values for ESS levels of demand, the ESSs were338
behaviourally not stable. The parameter p, determining the benefit of339
parental supply for offspring survival, was not associated with behavioural340
stability (Table 1).for the begging cost parameter predicted ESSs that are341
also BSSs, and higher values for the begging cost parameter lead to342
predicted ESSs that are behaviourally not attainable (Table 1).343
Discussion344
Behavioural interactions based on continuous strategies generate complex345
dependencies and behavioural dynamics over time, raising the question of346
behavioural stability. To define a condition for behavioural stability in347
repeated interactions we proposed the novel concept of the behaviourally348
stable strategy (BSS): a BSS is characterized by behavioural dynamics of349
repeated interactions that converge towards the behavioural equilibrium.350
While the BSS is a proximate condition for the outcome of behavioural351
interactions, it has repercussions on evolutionary stability in a stricter352
sense. Non converging behavioural dynamics imply deviation from the353
expressed behavioural levels that would represent the ESS. Thus, by354
definition, behaviourally unstable strategies lead to deviation from the355
single-interaction or negotiation ESS (see below) and to corresponding356
fitness penalties. To illustrate this argument further, we have shown by357
simulations that there are realistic conditions under which ESSs for358
parent-offspring conflict resolution are behaviourally not stable. While this359
analysis is based on scramble competition resolution models (Parker et al.360
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2002), in principle the same basic conclusion apply to honest signalling361
models (Godfray 1991) because neither type of model incorporates the362
dynamics of repeated interactions.363
Negotiation models (McNamara et al. 1999; Taylor & Day 2004; Johnstone364
& Hinde 2006) and quantitative genetic models of interacting phenotypes365
(Moore et al. 1997; Kölliker 2003) both assume |λ| to be smaller than 1 and366
thereby ensure behavioural stability in the predicted evolutionary367
outcomes. Our model provides the biological rationale for this critical368
assumption in negotiation and interacting phenotype models.369
Behavioural stability370
The behavioural stability of parent-offspring interactions at the equilibrium371
depends only on the derivatives (the change rates) of the supply and372
demand function. The absolute value of the product of the two derivatives373
has to be smaller than 1 (Eq. 2). Samuelson (1941, 1976) found analogous374
results for linear demand and supply functions in economics for the375
equilibrium prices of products. This result can be biologically interpreted376
such that the stability condition is likely to be violated when at least one377
interactant reacts too sensitively (i.e. it ’overreacts’) to a behavioural378
change in the other interactant, leading to unsteady (oscillating) dynamics.379
380
Under the assumptions of an intercept of 0 for the supply and of 1 for the381
demand function, the equilibrium is behaviourally stable for linear response382
functions as well as for power response functions, when the begging level at383
the equilibrium is larger than 0.5 (i.e. generally speaking the average384
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between the minimum and maximum level, see Appendix). We present the385
derivation for the linear case, although an equivalent solution can be shown386
for power functions (G. Nöldeke, personal communication; R. Dobler and387
M. Kölliker, unpublished results)388
The increased complexity in the response functions from a linear to a389
power function had no impact on the outcome of the behavioural stability390
in our simulations. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the possibility that391
response functions with a more elaborate complexity (e.g. logistic392
functions, quadratic functions or higher order functions) may influence the393
behavioural stability, including the possibility of multiple alternative394
behavioural equilibria (i.e. more than one intersection point). In such more395
complex cases the stability may not only depend on the response functions396
and their derivatives but also on the starting conditions, adding another397
level of complexity to the model. For such models it would not only be398
interesting to find stability conditions but also to find possible conditions399
and circumstances that allow the interaction to change from one400
behavioural equilibrium to another. Under such more complex conditions,401
behaviourally stable equilibria may not always be attainable.402
Communication errors and shifting response functions (e.g. due to changing403
environmental conditions or offspring age) may make the behavioural404
equilibrium shift over time, which would constantly reintroduce behavioural405
dynamics, likely rendering even stronger the expected selection pressure on406
behavioural reaction norms that allow fast behavioural convergence. In407
future models it would be interesting to incorporate perception errors, time408
lags and developmental/plastic function adjustments (Johnstone & Grafen409
1992; Johnstone 1994), and to study such plasticity in experimental work410
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(e.g. Hinde & Kilner 2007). Such inclusions would add realism and411
specificity to the model, but our major conclusion that the behavioural412
dynamics need to be addressed for an understanding of evolved strategies413
in repeated social interactions will most likely not be affected.414
So far, empirical studies on behavioural dynamics mainly focused on the415
average effect which a change in behaviour (experimental or natural) of an416
interactant has on the behaviour of another interactant (e.g. Smith et al.417
1988; Kilner 1995; Ottosson et al. 1997; Kilner et al. 1999). Although these418
studies give valuable insight on the overall adjustment (change rate) and419
plasticity of behaviour s, they do not address the underlying dynamics420
leading to the observed behavioural outcome. Experiments where a421
supposedly equilibrated system is deviated temporarily and the subsequent422
interaction-to-interaction dynamics analysed explicitly could provide the423
data required to determine to what degree a behavioural reaction norm424
(i.e. response rule) approach can actually be used to model the behavioural425
dynamics in repeated interactions (Roulin 2002; Hinde & Kilner 2007;426
Smiseth et al. 2008). Behaviourally stable strategies (BSSs) are expect to427
stabilise back to the initial equilibrium after the temporary disturbance.428
Application of the BSS concept429
Applying our BSS model to scramble competition resolution models430
(Parker 1985; Mock & Parker 1997; Parker et al. 2002) confirms that431
predicted ESSs of single-interaction models are not necessarily432
behaviourally stable strategies. Some are either outside the parameter433
range or they represent a behaviourally unstable equilibrium. In both434
cases, what would be the ESS can behaviourally never be reached,435
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regenerating selection in the interactions. Under the specific conditions of436
the chosen intercepts, and from a perspective of behavioural stability,437
intermediate to high begging levels should be favoured over the course of438
selection, because only these can be the result of convergent behavioural439
dynamics. This may appear counterintuitive at first sight, as one would440
associate higher begging levels with increased costs, which should be441
evolutionarily unfavourable (Moreno-Rueda 2007). However, higher442
begging costs also imply lower evolved begging levels at the ESS (Parker443
1985; see Appendix) and when ESS begging levels exceed the level for444
behavioural stability, instability ensues (Table 1). Thus, there are445
behavioural stability constraints in parent-offspring interactions, which446
would favour evolutionary conflict resolutions with relatively high levels of447
begging and, hence, relatively low associated begging costs. In addition to448
the well-studied selection for optimal conflict resolution, we suggest449
selection on behavioural reaction norms that enhance the likelihood for450
behaviourally stable repeated interactions.451
Conclusions452
The importance of behavioural stability is not restricted to the functional453
context of parent-offspring interactions, but may include any context where454
fast-responding short-term interactions are involved (e.g. dominance455
interactions (Matsumura & Kobayashi 1998), biological markets (Noe &456
Hammerstein 1994, 1995), cell interactions (Hofmeyr & Cornish-Bowden457
2000), negotiation over care (McNamara et al. 1999; Taylor & Day 2004;458
Johnstone & Hinde 2006)).459
There are usually many BSSs that are not an ESS. Many interactions460
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behaviourally converge but yield behavioural levels with suboptimal fitness461
consequences. This is not surprising, since behavioural stability alone tells462
us nothing about fitness. More revealing are the cases where a predicted463
ESS (in terms of a pair of slopes for the supply and demand reaction464
norms) is not a BSS. We could show for the scramble competition model465
(Parker 1985; Mock & Parker 1997; Parker et al. 2002) that behaviourally466
unstable ESSs are predicted when begging costs are of greater than some467
intermediate level. BSS and ESS are two conditions to evaluate the468
stability of repeated interactions that deal with the proximate and ultimate469
dimension of repeated interactions, respectively. Both need to be met for470
evolutionary stability in a stricter sense.471
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Appendix477
Alternative proof of the behavioural stability conditions for478
linear behavioural reaction norms479
The change in begging over one time step is480
Dn+1 = b(aDn + y) + x.
The change of begging level over n time steps is therefore481
Dn = anbnD0+an−1bny+an−1bn−1x+an−2bn−1y+an−2bn−2x+...+abx+by+x.
Factoring out aibi for 0 6 i 6 (n− 1) leads to482
Dn = anbnD0 + (x+ yb)
i=n−1∑
i=0
anbn.
The second term on the right hand side is a geometric series that for483
n→∞ only converges, when |ab| < 1. For this case (|ab| < 1) the first484
term on the right hand side converges to 0. From this we can conclude that485
the repeated interaction only converges towards the equilibrium (Deq)486
when |ab| < 1. Otherwise the interaction diverges.487
The demand level at the equilibrium Deq (for |ab| < 1) is:488
Deq = lim
n→∞ a
nbnD0 + (x+ yb)
i=n−1∑
i=0
anbn =
x+ yb
1− ab .
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For the linear case in our simulation we have x = 1 and y = 0, resulting in489
Deq =
1
1− ab. (A-1)
This proves that the behavioural equilibrium is only stable if and only if490
Deq > 0.5 (because |ab| < 1).491
More generally, the threshold level for stability/instability Deq for any492
intercepts x and y is493
Deq =
x+ y
1− ab =
x+ y
2
.
Because 1− ab < 2, the lowest value for Deq is the mean of the two494
intercepts x and y, representing the threshold demand level for BSS.495
Details of the scramble competition model496
Following Mock & Parker (1997) and Parker et al. (2002), we used the497
following functions for cost and benefit. For the costs of begging we used498
the survival probability κ:499
κ(D) = pD + 1,
with p as the parameter (slope) for the cost of begging (−1 < p < 0) and500
an intercept of 1. As the costs reduce the net benefit, the intercept of 1501
indicates no costs when there is no begging. Values of p close to 0 indicate502
a weak begging cost which becomes higher the more p diverges from 0.503
With p = −1, maximal begging results in a survival probability of 0. For504
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the benefit (µ) of supply we used505
µ(S) = 1− e−q(S−0.1),
with the parameter q for the benefit of supply bigger than 0 (q > 0).506
Applying these functions to the ESS conditions of the scramble507
competition model (Parker 1985, Eqs 2 and 3; Mock & Parker 1997) with508
β =
0.5v
v − 1
for the case of ’true monogamy’ (see Parker 1985) and509
α+ β = 1.
α and β are coefficients assigned to special levels of sib competition,510
parental care and mating system. v is the product of the two gradients of511
the supply and demand functions (Parker et al. 2002)512
v = g′(Deq)f ′(Seq).
This leads to513
DESS = β
κ(DESS)
κ′(DESS)
=
(
0.5ab
ab− 1
)
pDESS + 1
DESS
(A-2)
as the stability condition for demand and514
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SESS = α
µ(SESS)
µ′(SESS)
=
(
1− 0.5ab
ab− 1
)
1− e−q(SESS−0.1)
e−q(SESS−0.1)k
(A-3)
as the stability conditions for supply. This are the two strategies offspring515
and parents, respectively, should play to solve the POC from an516
evolutionary perspective.517
Note: v (see Parker et al. 2002) is equivalent to λ in our condition for518
behavioural stability.519
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Table 1: Simulation results for behavioural and evolutionary stability for different
parameter combinations p and q in the cost and benefit functions. ’NA’ indicates
parameter combinations with no evolutionary equilibrium in the parameter range of
our simulation. ’YES’ indicates parameter combinations with evolutionary equilibria
which are also behavioural equilibria. ’yes’ indicates parameter conditions with evo-
lutionary equilibria that are also behavioural equilibria but where the difference of
the two is larger than 0.001 (our grid resolution) in at least one dimension (supply or
demand). ’no’ indicates parameter combinations with evolutionary equilibria which
are no behavioural equilibria. Begging cost increases from left to right. Provisioning
benefit increases from top to bottom. The reason why we could not clearly assign
some evolutionary equilibria to unique grid points in our simulation (p values of −0.15
and −0.2) is, that the sum of the deviations of the intercepts for the two functions
was in these cases larger then the grid resolution, although taken separately each
intercept fulfilled our matching criteria. Hence, our inability to assign these evolu-
tionary equilibria is a result of our matching criteria for the intercepts rather than
a methodological problem in the simulation of repeated interactions. Therefore, it is
likely that these evolutionary equilibria represent the proper behavioural equilibria.
Begging cost parameter p
-0.05 -0.1 -0.15 -0.2 -0.25 -0.3 -0.35 -0.4 -0.45 -0.5
P
ro
vi
si
on
in
g
be
ne
fit
pa
ra
m
et
er
q 0.5 NA YES NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1 NA YES yes yes YES YES YES no no no
1.5 NA YES yes yes YES YES YES no no no
2 NA YES yes yes YES YES YES no no no
2.5 NA YES yes yes YES YES YES no no no
3 NA YES yes yes YES YES YES no no no
3.5 NA YES yes yes YES YES YES no no no
4 NA YES yes yes YES YES YES no no no
4.5 NA YES yes yes YES YES YES no no no
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Figure 1: Dynamics of repeated interactions. By superimposing the demand func-
tion and the inverted supply function the repeated interdependent parent-offspring
interaction can be graphically visualized. Starting at a demand level Dn (filled
square) leads over repeated interactions to the supply level Sn+4. The equilibrium
(Seq, Deq, solid diamond) represents the point of behavioural matching between par-
ents and offspring over supply and demand level, respectively. a) A behaviourally
stable parent-offspring interaction converges toward the equilibrium. b) An interac-
tion that diverges away from the equilibrium is behaviourally not stable.
Figure 2: Illustration of the used supply and demand function types (behavioural
reaction norms). a) Inverted linear supply functions (to superimpose with the de-
mand function) for different slopes. b) Different slopes for linear demand functions.
c) Several different inverted supply power functions (to superimpose with demand
functions). d) Different demand power functions.
Figure 3: Supply (dashed) and demand (solid) functions which intersect in the grey
shaded area represent behaviourally stable strategies (BSS). Function pairs with an
intersection in the white area represent a behaviourally unstable strategy. a) Linear
response functions. One supply function and two different demand functions. One
combination leads to a BSS, the other is behaviourally not stable. The threshold
level of 0.5 was derived analytically. b) Same as in a) but with power functions and
threshold level according to the results of our numerical simulations. In a) and b)
the inverted supply function is drawn to superimpose the two functions.
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